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I. INTRODUCTION
What does it mean to be an employee in the sharing economy?
* A.B., Princeton University (2006); Ph.D., University of Chicago (2013); J.D., University
of Chicago (expected June 2016). My thanks to Daniel Abebe, Anup Malani, and Jonathan
Masur for their comments on earlier drafts of this article, to Laura Weinrib for her careful and
generous reading and, as always, to John F. Acevedo. All errors remain mine alone.
1. The "sharing economy" isn't the only term used to describe these companies and their
business models. Maybe the most well-known alternative is "collaborative consumption."
RACHEL BOTSMAN & Roo ROGERS, WHAT'S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF COLLABORATIVE
1
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For a steadily growing percentage of the U.S. labor force it might
mean avoiding temporary joblessness, retaining a home, or acquiring
discretionary income. It might also mean working multiple unrelated
jobs for fluctuating wages and no benefits while subject to the
invisible oversight of a smartphone algorithm. But in fact, this is a
trick question because (outside California2 ) there are no employees in
the sharing economy.3 Uber drivers, Airbnb hosts, and TaskRabbit
Taskers have no contractual relationship with their companies
beyond a simple user agreement, and that agreement generally
describes them as independent contractors who work for the
consumer.4 This miscategorization fails to meaningfully reflect what
employment means for a growing number of Americans.
The sharing economy links individual workers ("suppliers") and
companies in an "employment" relationship - where the word
"employment" references the lay notion of compensated labor rather
than a specific legal classification with attendant rights and
responsibilities. (For clarity's sake, I'll indicate the legal category with
capitalization: Employee.) Because current law recognizes no
Employment relationship between suppliers and their companies,
those companies are free to impose increasingly substantial
requirements on suppliers and to market these requirements as part
of their brands while leaving suppliers to internalize the risks
CONSUMPTION (2010); see also The Power of Connection: Peer-to-Peer Business: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Small Business, 113th Cong. (2014) [hereinafter Peer-to-Peer Business
Hearing] (written testimony of Philip Auerswald, Assoc. Prof. of Pub. Pol'y, George Mason
Univ.) (on file with author) (using "sharing economy" and "peer-to-peer economy"); LISA
GANSKY, THE MESH: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SHARING (2010) (using "the mesh");
Arun Sundararajan, From Zipcar to the Sharing Economy, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 3, 2013,
<https://hbr.org/2013/01/from-zipcar-to-the-sharing-eco/> (using "sharing economy," "peer
economy," and "collaborative consumption"). The "sharing economy" has come under
increasing fire, both for its ostensible inaccuracy (it's really not about sharing) and for its
unhelpfulness (if it's not about sharing, then what is it about?). Compare Sofia Ranchordis,
Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J. L. SCI.
& TECH. 413 (2015) with Emily Badger, Why We Can't Figure Out How to Regulate Airbnb,
WASH., POST, Apr. 23, 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/04/23/
why-we-cant-figure-out-how-to-regulate-airbnb/> (arguing that "'sharing' is an ill-fitting word
for what most Airbnb hosts or Sidecar drivers are doing" because their services are not free).
2. Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739 EK, 2015 WL 4153765 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r,
June 3, 2015), appeal docketed, No. CGC-15-546378 (Cal. Super. Ct June 16, 2015).
3. This excludes the comparatively small number of "staff" positions at sharing economy
companies.
4. Uber maintains that, insofar as drivers have a contractual relationship with Uber itself,
that relationship derives from the fact that drivers are consumers of Uber's app ("Uber provides
drivers with a service and not the reverse."). Reply of Defendant Uber Techs., Inc. in Support
of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, O'Connor v. Uber Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N. D.
Cal. 2015) (No. C-13-3826 EMC).
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associated with transactions. What we need is a new way to think
about the individual businessperson in the sharing economy that
adequately captures the conditions under which she works but avoids
stifling this new economy's resource-maximizing potential. These
objectives are best satisfied by recognizing that the interaction
between companies and suppliers is a kind of employment and by
applying certain minimum requirements to that interaction.
This article makes three contributions to scholarship on the
sharing economy. Part II establishes a coherent and intuitive
taxonomy of the sharing economy that demonstrates the existence of
an "employment" relationship. Part III argues that this employment
relationship demands some regulatory response and critiques
suggestions that regulation is either temporarily or categorically
undesirable. Part IV articulates specific concerns that are triggered by
sharing economy employment and contends that some - but not all -
of these must be addressed by any regulatory response we choose to
adopt.
II. A TAXONOMY OF THE SHARING ECONOMY
A. Renters, Swappers, and Platforms'
Conversations about the sharing economy are still young enough
for the terminology to warrant independent analysis as well as the
occasional graphic illustration.6 Imagine a circle that encompasses the
entire range of companies usually associated with the sharing
economy: Airbnb, Uber, Feastly,' TaskRabbit, ZipCar, Rent the
5. For similar terminology, see Julio Hamari et al., The Sharing Economy: Why People
Participate in Collaborative Consumption J. Ass'N INFO. SCI. & TECH. 2 (early online view 2015)
(on file with author) (using "renting, swapping, or trading"). However, Hamari et al. do not
develop the distinctions because their focus is on individuals' motivations for participating in the
sharing economy.
6. See Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 147, 150-84 (2016) (proposing ten "first principles" that "define the ways that the
sharing economy is transforming commerce" and "on which any future regulation must rest").
7. Feastly connects would-be diners looking for an in-home eating experience with
amateur and semi-professional chefs who prepare and serve meals in their own homes. Chefs
post meal descriptions, seating capacities, costs, and available dates that diners can browse.
Food with a Story, FEASTLY, <https://eatfeastly.com> (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
8. TaskRabbit allows individuals to hire others to perform discrete tasks (e.g., grocery-
shopping, gift-wrapping, event planning) at pre-arranged rates. We Do Chores. You Live Life,
TASKRABBIT, <https://www.taskrabbit.com> (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
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Runway,9 Couchsurfer,o eBay, Bitcoin, LiquidSpace," Kickstarter,
Etsy, Blue Apron2 - the list is huge and internally diverse.13 There is
good reason to describe all of these businesses as part of something
new, the sharing economy, because they use technology to facilitate
the use or exchange of assets by otherwise unconnected individuals.
In a sense, they're the Marshall Fields or the Selfridges of the twenty-
first century because - like those earliest department stores4
companies within this smaller circle are changing the time, place,
manner, and purpose of consumption.
9. Rent the Runway allows users to rent haute couture that they can't afford to buy.
Customers rent outfits for designated dates, keep the outfit for either four or eight days, receive
a backup size of the same outfit, and get free return shipping. Change your Closet Forever,
RENT THE RUNWAY, <https://www.renttherunway.com> (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
10. Couchsurfer connects travelers with individuals who are willing to host visitors in their
homes for free. Hosting usually involves more than simply providing a place to stay. Stay with
Locals for Free, COUCHSURFING, <https://www.couchsurfing.com> (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
11. LiquidSpace allows property owners to rent office spaces by the hour. Office Space that
Works the Way You Do, LIQUIDSPACE, <https://liquidspace.com> (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
12. Blue Apron delivers menus and pre-measured ingredients to users' homes so that they
can prepare meals from scratch without having to plan or go grocery shopping. Discover a Better
Way to Cook, BLUE APRON, <https://www.blueapron.com> (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
13. For different visualizations of sharing economy companies categorized by industry and
provider-type see JEREMIAH OWYANG, COLLABORATIVE ECONOMY HONEYCOMB: VERSION
2.0 (2014), available at <https://www.flickr.com/photos/jeremiah-owyang/15928658251/sizes/k/>
(last visited Mar. 20, 2016); JEREMIAH OWYANG, COLLABORATIVE ECONOMY HONEYCOMB:
VERSION 1.0 (May, 2014), <http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/05
/Honeycomb.jpg> (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
14. For general histories of the department store see, e.g., MICHAEL MOSS & ALISON
TURTON, A LEGEND OF RETAILING: THE HOUSE OF FRASER (1989); JAN WHITAKER, WORLD
OF DEPARTMENT STORES (2011).
15. See GANSKY, note 1 (describing "the negative consequences of modern consumerism"
that the sharing economy addresses, including environmental destruction, self-definition via
consumption patterns, and a valuation of independence over cooperation); Russell Belk, You
Are What You Can Access: Sharing and Collaborative Consumption Online, 67 J. BUS. RES.
1595, 1595 (2014) (concluding that the "old wisdom that we are what we own, may need
modifying to consider forms of possession and uses that do not involve ownership").
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Figure 1: Sharing Economy
Traditional Economy
Outside the circle are (figuratively) brick-and-mortar companies.
They may also adapt technology to their needs (e.g., using iPhone
squares to run credit cards). But what keeps these companies outside
the circle of the sharing economy is their use of a traditional model in
which one retailer offers relatively standardized products at
standardized rates to customers who transact with it directly, usually
in-person or via a website.
Within the sharing economy, many companies alter either the
means of transacting business (as with Zipcar1 6) or the goal of the
transaction (as with Rent the Runway"). At the very least, these
companies are changing what we consume - an extra vacation instead
of expensive car insurance, haute couture rather than off-the-rack
clothing. They're also changing how we think of consumption, in
terms of it being based on access versus ownership." These
differences are fascinating from a social science perspective.
Nevertheless, "renters" simply replicate traditional commercial
structures in which one entity directly rents (or sells) products and
services it owns to clients - in other words they are "gussied-up rental
16. Winter Meet Wanderlust, ZIPCAR, <http://www.zipcar.com/?redirect-p=0> (scroll down
to "how it works") (last visited Mar. 20, 2016) ("[b]ook a Zipcar for a couple hours or the whole
day. Do it online or on your phone via our mobile app ... [w]alk to the car and hold your
Zipcard to the windshield. Ta da.").
17. The World Saw a Dress. We Saw an Opportunity, RENT THE RUNWAY,
<https://www.renttherunway.com/pages/about> (last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (stating that "[b]y
giving people access to remarkable luxury experiences, we're changing the meaning of
ownership" and "[w]e exist because we believe a beautiful product shouldn't only be
experienced by owning it").
18. See generally GANSKY, supra note 1; Belk, supra, note 15.
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operations."1 9 More significantly, renters operate within existing
regulatory schemes: ZipCar drivers are subject to license checks
largely like those undergone by drivers who rent from ZipCar's






A different cluster of sharing economy companies is in the
business of facilitating sales, rentals, or exchanges between third
parties. Let's call this the "peer-to-peer" economy. Peer-to-peer
companies can be further broken down into "swappers" or
"platforms" on the basis of what they do (and what they don't do) in
order to facilitate those third party transactions. Swappers like
Couchsurfer, Craigslist, and LeftoverSwap facilitate transactions but
do not resolve information asymmetries between the parties or vouch
for the quality of what's bought, rented, or exchanged. The third
party transactors they connect may organically develop customs that
19. Doug Henwood, What the "Sharing Economy" Takes, THE NATION, Feb. 16, 2015, at
13.
20. Actually, Zipcar drivers face some greater restrictions. Compare Frequently Asked
Questions, ZIPCAR, <http://www.zipcar.com/how#faqs-category-joining> (click on "What are
the eligibility requirements to join Zipcar?") (last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (stating that applicants
with non-US or Ontario licenses "are required to complete and submit a 'declarations form'
attesting to the validity of their driving history and license status" and that Michigan drivers
under the age of twenty-one must have no major violations, "incidents," or alcohol or drug
related violations) with Avis Car Rental FAQs, AVIS, <http://www.avis.com/car-rental/content/
render-faq.ac#> (under "Country," select "USA," under "Find a Topic," select "Requirements
for Renting," and under "Requirements for Renting, FAOs," select "Avis accepted Forms of
Identification") (last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (accepting any license issued by "any U.S. state,
territory or possession ... Canadian province ... a country that participated in the 1949 Geneva
convention on Road Traffic or the 1943 Convention on the Regulation of Inter-American
Automobile Traffic ... a country that has a reciprocal agreement with the U.S.").
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resolve some of these issues - think of the bulletin board practice of
including small, tearable strips of paper with a seller's contact info -
but these aren't really part of what the company itself does. In
keeping with their function as glorified bulletin boards, swappers earn
minimal to no money from the transactions they facilitate.21
Consequently, they're also mostly interesting from a social science
rather than a legal perspective.





Like swappers, platforms facilitate third party transactions by
using technology to connect disparate individuals with
complementary needs.22 However, unlike swappers, platforms insert
themselves into the transaction in two ways: by resolving information
asymmetries between the third parties and by providing a minimal
but independent source of quality control. (This, of course, is a far
from neutral assertion: the license agreements and operating models
of all platforms are based on the idea that the platform is not a party
21. Couchsurfer and LeftoverSwap currently do not earn revenue from the services they
provide. Devan Rosen et al., CouchSurfing: Belonging and Trust in a Globally Cooperative
Online Social Network, 13 NEW MEDIA & SOC'Y 981, 982 (2011); Elise Hu, A New App Will Let
You Share Your Leftovers with Strangers, NPR (July 29, 2013), <http://www.npr.org/blogs/
alltechconsidered/2013/07/29/206493794/a-new-app-will-let-you-share-your-leftovers-with-stran
gers>. Craigslist's revenue streams are extremely limited (fees for job listings in seven major
U.S. areas, and a $ 10 fee for apartment rentals in New York). Keith Patrick, How Craigslist
Makes Money, CHRONCOM, <http://smallbusiness.chron.com/craigslist-money-27287.html>
(last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
22. The term "platforms" is derived from the companies' own view of their role as a zone
or stage on which two third parties can connect with one another. See, e.g., The TaskRabbit
Platform, TASKRABBIT <https://www.taskrabbit.com/platform> (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
Despite the incongruence in using a term while rejecting the view it signifies, "platform" has two
advantages that make it worth sticking with for now: first, it's already associated with these
particular companies, and second, it evokes the relationship between the company and
suppliers/consumers.
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to any of the transactions it enables.)23
Platforms often promote information exchange by establishing a
system of reputational feedback, as when Airbnb and Feastly users
rate each other and those ratings are made visible to other users.
Additionally, most platforms provide an independent source of
information to users, as when Uber and TaskRabbit perform security
checks on drivers and Taskers.
Virtually all platforms do both: Airbnb verifies all users' personal
identities and Feastly vets its cooks, while Uber and TaskRabbit also
allow users to publicly rate their experiences.2 Finally, and also unlike
swappers, platforms add an additional level of security by processing
monetary exchanges themselves. For all of this added value,







A quick word is in order about how suppliers match up against
23. See, e.g., Terms and Conditions, FEASTLY (last updated Oct. 23, 2014), <https://eat
feastly.com/t-andc/> (stating, among other things, that "YOU UNDERSTAND AND
AGREE THAT FEASTLY IS NOT A PARTY TO ANY AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO
BETWEEN COOKS AND FEASTERS IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCE"); Terms and Conditions
of Use, LIQUIDSPACE (last revised Feb. 17, 2016), <https://liquidspace.com/Home/Terms-Of-
Use> (stating, among other things, that "[y]our transactions, communications and interactions
with any other Users, including transactions, communications and interactions initiated through
the Service, are solely between you and such Users").
24. Not all platforms offer independent quality control of the product or service being
offered - and given the coordination costs involved, space rental services (Airbnb, HomeAway,
LiquidSpace) are perhaps least likely to exercise independent quality control. What nonetheless
distinguishes these platforms from swappers is their provision of other services. For example,
the office space rental service LiquidSpace doesn't independently evaluate the venues posted by
owners, but it does offer secure and automatic payment, as well as automatic linking to the
calendaring services used by many businesses. Terms and Conditions of Use, LIQUIDSPACE (last
revised Feb. 17, 2016), <https://liquidspace.com/Home/Terms-Of-Use>.
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existing regulatory categories like franchisees and temporary workers
hired via matchmaking agencies. Platforms have been described as
"almost like a digital franchise," because suppliers seem like micro-
entrepreneurs and platforms create brand recognition via supplier
controls.25 But commentators have already noted that franchising isn't
a good analogy because platform employment involves a "far greater
delegation of ownership and control to [platforms]."26
The "temporary worker" analogy is more complicated. Platforms
- perhaps TaskRabbit more than others - do seem somewhat like
Employment agencies. But suppliers are unlikely to qualify as
"temporary Employees" even under the Fair Labor Standards Act's27
broad "economic realities" test, let alone the several other relevant
acts (like the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 28 and
Occupational Safety and Health Act 2 9) that use a narrower common
law agency test.30 Suppliers also share similarities to "on-call
workers," but again the match is far from perfect because suppliers
are not a reserve pool that platforms rely on when their regular
Employees are unavailable.31 Above all, if we want to respect the new
controls and freedoms inherent in platform employment - and if we
don't want to regulate sharing economy companies out of existence -
then it doesn't make sense to squeeze suppliers into marginally
relevant legal categories that trigger a whole host of undesirable
responsibilities.32
B. Platforms and Regulatory Concerns: "Participation" and
"Substitution"
When we focus on what different sharing economy companies
25. Arun Sundararajan, What Airbnb Gets About Culture that Uber Doesn't, HARV. Bus.
REV., Nov. 27, 2014, <https://hbr.org/2014/11/what-airbnb-gets-about-culture-that-uber-doesnt>.
26. Id.
27. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 75 Pub. Law No. 718, 52 Stat. 1060.
28. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 93 Pub. Law No. 406, 88 Stat. 829.
29. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 91 Pub. Law No. 596, 84 Stat. 1590.
30. See Katherine V. W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment
Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 269 (2006).
31. Id. at 256.
32. Consequently, it's tempting but dangerous to think that the sharing economy's
classification issues can be resolved by simply buckling down even more on existing principles.
But see Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U. C. Davis. L.
Rev. 1511, 1538 (2016) (arguing that in sharing economy classification cases, courts should focus
their inquiry on "flexibility" because "to the extent control is the measure of independence,
flexibility is often the best evidence of control").
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actually do it's easy to see why platforms cause more regulatory
concern than renters or swappers. First, platforms don't simply scale
up or tweak existing practices while remaining conventional retailers
or "matchmakers" for third parties.33 They participate in the
transactions they facilitate. The logic in hiring someone to mow your
lawn via TaskRabbit rather than using Craigslist's "Odd Jobs" section
is that the Tasker has been vetted by a third party and comes with
easily available performance evaluations.34 Put differently, platforms
meaningfully change the terms on which individuals transact by
adding information and security to the process of two strangers
conducting business sight unseen.3
Second, platforms often substitute themselves for government
safeguards meant to protect public goods like safety, non-
discrimination, and fair labor practices. Uber, for instance, vets
aspiring drivers - actually, Uber has suggested that it does a better
job of fulfilling this public safety function than taxi licensing boards.36
33. See, e.g., Lyft Terms of Service, LYFT (Feb. 8, 2016), <https://www.lyft.com/terms>
(stating, among other things, that "The Lyft Platform provides a marketplace where persons
who seek transportation to certain destinations ('Riders') can be matched with persons driving
to or through those destinations ('Drivers')" (emphasis added)).
34. Tom Slee, Some Obvious Things About Internet Reputation Systems, WHIMSLEY (Sept.
29, 2013, 22:40 PM), <http://tomslee.net> ("Classified ads, whether local newspapers or sites like
Craigslist and Kijiji, solve coordination problems but do not even try to solve problems of trust
beyond the most basic verification.").
35. Again, this is a hotly contested area: Uber, Airbnb, Craigslist and eBay all invoke the
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012), to argue that they are mere
marketplaces and not providers. Ellen Huet, Uber Rider Might Lose an Eye from Driver's
Hammer Attack. Could Uber Be Held Liable?, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2014, 9:37 PM), <http://www.
forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/09/30/uber-driver-hammer-attack-liability/>; see also Alatraqchi
v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3156-JSC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119642, at *15-17 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 22, 2013) (dismissing a former Uber driver's complaint because, among other reasons, he
had inconsistently described his relationship with Uber as being that of an employee and of an
independent contractor).
36. Uber's website used to state that "within each city we operate, we aim to go above and
beyond local requirements to ensure your comfort and security." Complaint at 5-6, California v.
Uber Techs., Inc., No. CGC-14-543120 (San Francisco Cry. Super. Ct filed Dec. 9, 2014)
(emphasis added). See Joe, Details on Safety, UBER NEWSROOM (July 15, 2015), <https: // news
room.uber.com/details-on-safety/?_ga=1.95799516.1304615373.1457295665> contrasting Uber's
screening process with that undergone by California taxi drivers); Chris Taylor, General
Manager, Uber Chicago, Lunch Talk at the University of Chicago Law School: Uber and
Innovating in a Regulatory Regime (Dec. 1, 2014) (stating that the City of Chicago only
requires that aspiring taxi drivers pass criminal background checks within Illinois, but Uber
Chicago checks criminal backgrounds across all states).
EMPLOYMENT IN THE SHARING ECONOMY
True, Uber's claim is unusually ambitious (as demonstrated by the
California lawsuits explicitly challenging its consumer non-
discrimination policies37 and its background checks38). But the
underlying idea that platforms can combine some form of internal
oversight with reputational feedback mechanisms to meet or exceed
the goals of the regulations they sidestep is hardly unique to Uber.
At first glance, it may seem that "substitution" mostly affects
consumers while "participation" mostly affects suppliers, so that it
makes sense to discuss each group's concerns separately. Nascent
critiques of substitution generally do focus on whether reputational
feedback and internal oversight adequately protect consumers (for
example, does Uber adequately screen out aspiring drivers who are
sexual predators?).39 But the adequacy of platform-driven substitution
is an issue for suppliers too - for instance, does Airbnb encourage
racial biases that, were it regulated on par with the hotel industry,
might subject it to anti-discrimination penalties?0
Likewise, platforms' refusal to acknowledge participation in the
37. Complaint at 1, Nat'1 Fed'n of the Blind of Cal. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d
1073 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (3:14-cv-04086-NC) (arguing that Uber violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-189 (2012), by denying "blind individuals with service
animals full and equal access to Defendants' UberX transportation service").
38. Complaint at 5-11, California v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. CGC-14-543120 (San Francisco
Cry. Super. Ct filed Dec. 9, 2014) (arguing that Uber's failure to use fingerprint analysis as well
as its reliance on self-reported information devalues the vetting process and give consumers a
false sense of security); Karen Gullo, Uber Sued by San Francisco, Los Angeles Prosecutors,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 9, 2014, 4:33 PM), <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-
09/uber-sued-by-california-prosecutors-in-consumer-protection-case>; seealso Gillette v. Uber
Techs., Inc., No. 3:14-cv-05241-LB (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 15, 2014) (arguing, among other things,
that Uber's improper use of an ex-driver's consumer background report violated the Fair Credit
Reporting Act); Ravi Mahesh, Note, From Jitney Buses to App-Based Ridesharing:
Understanding California's "Third Way" Approach to Ride-for-Hire Regulation, 88 S. CAL. L.
REV. 965, 993-99, 1013-14 (2015) (arguing against anti-competitive regulations for the ride-
sharing industry but supporting regulations that fulfill the basic tenets of health and safety
regulation).
39. See, e.g., Olivia Nuzzi, Uber's Biggest Problem Isn't Surge Pricing. What If It's Sexual
Harassment By Drivers?, THE DAILY BEAST (Mar. 28, 2014), <http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2014/03/28/uber-s-biggest-problem-isn-t-surge-pricing-what-if-it-s-sexual-harassment-by
-drivers.html>.
40. Benjamin Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com
(Harvard Bus. School, Working Paper No. 14-054, 2014) (finding that black Airbnb hosts are on
average only able to charge 12 percent less than non-black hosts and pay a larger price penalty
for having a poor location); Curtis M. Wong, Airbnb Removes Texas Property Listing After
Owner Reportedly Rejects Gay Couple, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 30, 2015, <http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/30/airbnb-gay-couple-discrimination- _7183806.html>. Note that
platforms don't encourage discrimination the way, say, a hotel does when it complies with a
guest's request to not have a black maid clean her room. But query whether discrimination
occurs at the point of suppliers' entry and exit from the platform.
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transactions they facilitate seemingly affects suppliers more than
consumers, since suppliers can be held to demanding standards (the
ubiquitous five star Uber rating41) yet kicked off the platform without
notice or appeal because they are not even classified as Independent
Contractors vis-A-vis the platform.42 But "participation denial" also
affects consumers, who come under considerable pressure to retract
negative ratings from suppliers desperate to avoid termination. When
consumers succumb to such pressure and give undeservedly high
ratings, they damage the reliability of reputational feedback
mechanisms - which, in turn, produces a "substitution" problem.43 In
other words, there are no purely "consumer" or "supplier" problems.
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to momentarily narrow our
focus to the issues facing platform suppliers. First, supplier issues are
already important to a large and growing population that is uniquely
vulnerable.44 Suppliers are at a disadvantage relative to their platform
"employers" because platforms have the resources to effect the same
kind of regulatory capture associated with industry incumbents while
suppliers lack union-derived bargaining power.45 Nascent supplier
associations don't solve this problem because, as non-Employees,
41. Slee, supra note 34, at 6 (analyzing reputational feedback systems and noting, with
respect to Blablacar, that with "over 98% of ratings being five stars, the reputation system does
not meaningfully discriminate among drivers or riders ... [and] fails to solve the problem of
trust").
42. Mimzy, Uber Driver (San Diego), Comment to Uber Pay Cuts & Unfair Ratings
System - Wash Rinse Repeat, UberPeople (Sept. 14, 2014), <http://uberpeople.net/threads/uber-
driver-pay-cuts-unfair-ratings-system-wash-rinse-repeat.3543/> (on file with author) (noting that
drivers "are tied to a system of the customer has the last and final say - no matter how unruly,
rude, intoxicated, or just plain uninformed the passenger may be - with the best intentions
thinking 4 is 'very good'... with Uber. 4.5 is grounds for IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION OR
TERMINATION from the system"). Note that Uber's settlements of misclassification claims in
California and Massachusetts provide that drivers in those states will no longer be subject to
immediate and un-appealable deactivation. O'Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No.
3:13-cv-03826-EMC (Apr. 21, 2016), Class Action Settlement and Release 135(a) at 36.
43. See Nuzzi, supra note 39 (describing how an ex-Uber driver upset by the author's low
rating and his subsequent ermination wrote to the author at her work email address as well as
to her employer, and provided the author's name and photo to a third party as part of a request
for help appealing the termination).
44. See, e.g., Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85
(2015) (observing that Uber "enables discrimination by drivers and passengers" and that it is
"undermining working standards for taxi drivers and compensating its own drivers poorly" but
that the company's "ultimate effect on labor standards is ... unclear").
45. Perry Stein, Uber's Next Fight with the D.C. Council? A Wheelchair-Accessibility Bill,
WASH. CITY PAPER (Nov. 20 2014, 4:46 PM), <http://www. washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/city
desk/2014/11/20/ubers-next-fight-with-the-d-c-council-a-wheelchair-accessibility-bill/> (noting
that in D.C., Uber is lobbying against a proposed vehicle accessibility bill that would not place
any demands on Uber itself but would require it to report requests for wheelchair-accessible
vehicles to help the city keep track of demand).
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suppliers can be punished for their efforts at collective organization.4 6
And unlike their counterparts in many incumbent industries (who
also can't officially unionize) suppliers are subject to stringent
performance controls and don't enjoy fixed profit margins.47 Given
their collective action problems and the phenomenon of control
without protection, suppliers are unsurprisingly resorting to class
action lawsuits as a way of resolving issues with their platforms.48
Second, it is worth focusing on suppliers because supplier issues
are gaining traction in regulatory circles and will continue to do so as
more regions enact legislation targeting platforms.49 Right now many
of these laws are industry-specific rules that highlight the close and
largely unexamined relationship between platforms and suppliers -
think of San Francisco's requirement that Airbnb hosts pay hotel
taxes,o or Boston's demand that Uber extend the scope of driver
46. The California App-Based Drivers' Association (CADA) is one such "non-union
association" catering to platform suppliers. The O'Connor settlement allows Uber drivers to
participate in a drivers' association without fear of retaliation and provides for quarterly
meetings between Uber and the leaders of the association, as well as some funding for the
association. At the same time, it also expressly notes that the association "is not a union" and
"will not have the right or capacity to bargain collectively with Uber." Michael Skapinker,
Unions Suffer for Lack of a Killer App, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at 10; see also O'Connor v.
Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (denying summary judgment based on
genuine issue of material fact regarding employment status of Uber drivers for purposes of
California Labor Code); Elizabeth Kennedy, Comment, Freedom from Independence:
Collective Bargaining Rights for "Dependent Contractors", 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
143, 152-53 (2005) (observing that NLRA protections don't extend to independent
contractors).
47. Non-union associations do sometimes exist among independent contractors - for
example, the National Taxi Workers' Alliance founded in New York City by Bhairavi Desai.
The NTWA has managed to build a strong association (roughly 18,000 of New York's estimated
50,000 yellow cab drivers). See Mission & History, NYTWA, <http://www.nytwa.org/mission-
and-history/> (last visited Mar. 21, 2016). Similarly, over 1000 Uber drivers in New York
recently signed cards with a non-union association, the Amalgamated Local of Livery
Employees in Solidarity (ALLES). Uber Drivers in New York Form Labor Association, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (May 1, 2016), <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/uber-new-york-labor-
association us 5726852fe4b0f309baf132d7>.
48. See O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1133 (Uber drivers litigating tip laws); Gillette v.
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:14-cv-05241-LB (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 15, 2014) (Uber drivers
litigating alleged violations under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 1970, Pub. Law No. 91-
508, 84 Stat. 1114).
49. See, e.g., David Harris, Massachusetts Set to Ok Regulations on Uber, Lyft,
BIZJOURNALS (Jan. 2, 2015), <http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/startups/2015/01/mass
achusetts-gives-oksuber-other-ride-sharing.html?page= all> (describing proposed legislation that
calls for "ride-sharing companies to be regulated by the Department of Public Utilities" and
requiring "ride-sharing drivers to undergo a background check ... be 21 or older [and not] ...
have more than three traffic violations or one 'major traffic violation over a three-year
period"').
50. Tax on Transient Occupancy of Hotel Rooms, San. Francisco Bus. & Tax. Regulations
Code, art. 7, No. 1.504-1.
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background checks." As more industries are "disrupted" by platform
technology, regulators will need to separate problems that are
common to all platforms from those that are particular to the industry
in which a platform operates. This article argues, in part, that
platform suppliers face certain common challenges across industries
that can and should be regulated without damaging the platform
business model.
Finally, we should not be discouraged that the conversation
initially overlooked suppliers. That conversation has overwhelmingly
been driven by media commentary that initially focused on
conspicuous issues like consumer service (which platforms like to
emphasize) and unfair competition (which incumbents like to
emphasize). There have also been a few forays into third-party
effects, like the way Airbnb impacts housing availability.52 But as I've
already suggested, the platform business model affects suppliers in
ways that demand serious analysis. Indeed, media commentary is
already shifting towards the regulatory challenges posed by the
sharing economy.53 As more people move away from the conventional
workforce into part- or full-time work as platform suppliers, we need
to make "supplier issues" more than an afterthought. We can begin
by actively reconsidering Employment concepts that fail to reflect
what it means to participate in the sharing economy.
III. REGULATORY CONCERNS AND EXISTING APPROACHES TO
SHARING ECONOMY EMPLOYMENT
Labor and Employment regulation is meant to protect values or
public goods that the market can't always protect by itself. For
instance, we may want to prevent discrimination on the basis of
religion because we think it's wrong and even when prohibiting such
discrimination overrides rational entrepreneurial judgments to
51. Bob Salsberg, Bill Calls for Uber Background Checks, No Fingerprinting,
BOSTON.COM (Mar. 4, 2016, 2:12 PM), <http://archive.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/20
16/03/04/uber-bill-calls-for-background-checks-fingerprinting/p8ghJRFkE7sloUOFwZFYOI/sto
ry.html>.
52. Henwood, supra note 19; Miller, supra note 6; John J. Horton, The Tragedy of Your
Upstairs Neighbors: Is the Airbnb Negative Externality Internalized? (May 28, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
53. See Emily Badger, The Rise of Invisible Work, CITYLAB (Oct. 31, 2013),
<http://www.citylab.com/work/2013/10/rise-invisible-work/7412/> (quoting Sundararajan's tate-
ment that "eBay's impact hasn't been on the thousands of tech jobs it created for eBay ... but
on the hundreds of thousands of sellers it created" for the proposition that "the real economic
impact" of the sharing economy lies in the employment-related challenges it creates).
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maximize profits by appealing to customer prejudices.54 Just as well,
we may think legal intervention is necessary to manage the tradeoff
between having certain jobs and suffering the negative health and
societal effects attached to those jobs as Employers would like to
structure them.
The sharing economy evokes three kinds of responses: regulate it
out of existence,56 don't regulate it at all," and a variety of Goldilocks
approaches that I collectively call "wait-and-see."" Unsurprisingly,
54. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 153 (1997) ("Suppose,
for example, that purchasers or fellow employees refuse to buy from or work for a company that
does not discriminate .... [I]t is the failure to discriminate that operates as a tax on the
employer's business, rather than vice versa. The phenomenon is hardly unusual .... [M]arket
pressures create rather than prevent discrimination."). Federal courts have come out differently
on the issue of whether customer preference is a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
(BFOO) exempt under Title VII. Compare, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.
1971) (finding that a preference for female flight attendants on the part of co-workers, airline
employers, and customers did not justify sex discrimination in hiring flight attendants), and
Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that customer preference for
promoting men to executive positions did not constitute a BFOO but upholding the lower
court's finding against the employee because she was unqualified for the promotion), and
Abrams v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 805 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1986) (observing that the defendant
could have argued that religious affiliation was a BFOO but that even had it done so such
discrimination "would normally be prohibited from discrimination under Title VII"), with Kern
v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984)
(finding that an employer demonstrated that adherence to Islam was a BFOO for being a pilot
in Saudi Arabia because non-Muslims caught flying above Mecca are beheaded).
55. Compare, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Contractual Solutions for Employment Law
Problems, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 789, 790 (2014) (arguing, both generally as well as in the
specific context of youth unemployment and the minimum wage, that "one thing that is sure
today is that there are many forms of labor restrictions today not in place in the 1950s that help
account for increased unemployment rates"), with Robert C. Bird & Niki Mirtorabi, Shiftwork
and the Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 383, 429 (2006) (discussing the severe health
effects of "shiftwork" and arguing that "until law and policy towards shiftwork changes, millions
of Americans will remain unnecessarily exposed to an increased risk of a wide variety of health
and safety problems"), and Marion Crain, Work, Free Will and Law, 24 EMP. RESPONSIBILITIES
& RTS. J. 279, 280 (2012) (arguing that the at-will doctrine "leaves the public to pick up the costs
of supporting workers who are 'free' to agree to work at jobs regardless of how dangerous, low-
paying or onerous the working conditions may be").
56. See Dean Baker, Don't Buy the "Sharing Economy" Hype: Airbnb and Uber Are
Facilitating Rip-Offs, THE GUARDIAN, May 27, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentis
free/2014/may/27/airbnb-uber-taxes-regulation>; Tom Slee, Why Canada Should De-Activate
Uber, WHIMSLEY (Nov. 22, 2014) <http://tomslee.net/2014/11/why-canada-should-de-activate-
uber.html>.
57. Christopher Koopman et al., The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection
Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529 (2015);
Horton, supra note 52; John J. Horton, Does Airbnb Hosting Beggar Your Neighbor?, JOHN J.
HORTON (May 29, 2014), <http://john-joseph-horton.com/does-airbnb-hosting-beggar-your-
neighbor/>.
58. Peer-to-Peer Business Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of Arun Sundararajan,
Professor of Info., Operations & Mgmt. Sci., N.Y.U. Stern Sch. of Bus.) (stating that "[s]ome
level of government oversight seems necessary, certainly until there is enough data about the
extent to which the platforms can prevent market failure by themselves, and enough data about
any new safety or liability issues"); see also Boyd Cohen & Jan Kietzmann, Ride On! Mobility
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the first response has gained little traction in the United States - one
of its most vocal representatives has been the Canadian technology
and economics writer, Tom Slee - because, as the online journal
Knowledge@Wharton recently put it, even "as regulators continue to
crack the whip, there is little sign they will be able to stem the tide of
popularity for these services."59 Add to this the fact that platforms
operate with remarkable complaisance in legal gray (or red) zones,
and it becomes clear that option one is more suited for the dining
table rather than the classroom or city hall.
Option two - don't regulate at all - has some similar feasibility
problems, but they are less drastic. More importantly, option two is
likely to make intuitive sense to many Americans and their political
representatives.6 0 As a result it's worth taking a look at the nuts and
bolts of the "no regulation" response to the sharing economy.
Readers should note that the arguments below as well as throughout
the rest of this article are skewed to consider suppliers alone, and that
there are consumer and third party concerns that deserve dedicated
analysis as well.
A. No Regulation at All
1. Aligned Interests
In a short blog post, the labor scholar John J. Horton suggests
that since "[m]ost of these platforms make [sic] money by taking
some percentage of each labor transaction, they have an incentive to
tilt the platform . .. in favor of the worker."61 This kind of "aligned
Business Models for the Sharing Economy, 27 ORG. & ENV'T 279 (2014) (observing that "a
move toward merit-based business models may offer a more optimal alignment between service
provider and local government objectives" but not offering explicit regulatory proposals);
Jordan M. Barry & Paul L. Caron, Tax Regulation, Transportation Innovation, and the Sharing
Economy, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 69 (2015) (arguing that "existing regulatory structures
often discourage such innovations, reducing their popularity and slowing their development"
but acknowledging that "identifying these problems is easier than solving them" and concluding
that there are commonly "two diametrically opposite" and "imperfect" strategies that will
continue to "interact cyclically" until "someone comes up with a better innovation"); Badger,
supra note 53; Miller, supra note 6.
59. Sharing Economy 2.0: Can Innovation and Regulation Work Together?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Nov. 5, 2014), <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-
next- hase-for-the-sharing-economy/>.
60. On when regulation is appropriate see generally Richard A. Posner, Theories of
Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335, 335 (1974). On regulation in the
sharing economy, see Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and Innovation in the
Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116, 120 (2015).
61. John J. Horton, Labor in the Sharing Economy, JOHN J. HORTON (Aug. 18, 2014),
<http://john-joseph-horton.com/labor-in-the-sharing-economy/>.
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interests" argument is often made with respect to consumers - for
example Koopman et al. state that "reputational incentives at work
require firms to constantly seek ways to satisfy rapidly evolving
consumer demands and to gain (and keep) consumers' trust"62 - but
it's not immediately evident hat it does or should apply to suppliers.
The best case that it does goes something like this: platforms want to
maximize transactions, this depends in part on attracting suppliers
from a limited labor pool, so platforms are already motivated to offer
attractive terms.
There are several reasons why the pool of potential suppliers for
any given platform is unlikely to be limited enough to generate
competition. To begin with (and to borrow some public choice
terminology) suppliers are essentially a "non-rivalrous" good.63 An
Uber driver can simultaneously be a Lyft driver, a Tasker, and part-
time sales associate at her local department store.6 While there are
accounts of platforms competing with one another for suppliers -
witness Uber's "undercover operation" to recruit Lyft drivers65 - the
truth is probably less entertaining. Suppliers often simultaneously
work on competitor platforms, as with Uber and Lyft. Or, as with
Airbnb and Homeaway, platforms that seemingly compete in the
same supplier pool actually do not because consumer preferences
lead them to target distinct suppliers.66 Either way, platforms do not
self-evidently have cause to lure suppliers away from their platform
competitors, or even from non-platforms. Finally, although many
platforms impose certain requirements on suppliers, that screening
process seems unlikely to narrow the pool enough to force platforms
to compete for suppliers.67
62. Koopman et al., supra note 57, at 542.
63. Non-rivalrous goods are those that can be used by A without becoming unavailable to
B. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 37, 40 (2004).
64. See Natasha Singer, In the Sharing Economy, Workers Find Both Freedom and
Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/technology/in-the-
sharing-economy-workers-find-both-freedom-and-uncertainty.html?_r=0 (describing Jennifer,
who cobbles together an income from work acquired on four platforms and a swapper,
Craigslist).
65. Neil Irwin, Uber's Secret Agents: When Poaching Becomes Unethical, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
27, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/upshot/ubers-secret-agents-was-poaching-from-
lyft-unethical.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=0>.
66. Miguel Helft, Growing Quietly in Airbnb's Shadow, FORTUNE, Mar. 12, 2014,
<http://fortune.com/2014/03/12/growing-quietly-in-airbnbs-shadow/> (noting that Airbnb started
out renting rooms, not entire units, and focuses on major metropolitan areas, whereas
HomeAway rents entire units and is clustered in vacation spots).
67. As things stand, there's no information regarding either "admissions rates" or "yield
rates."
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This last point is worth underscoring. One of the prime
enticements held out by platforms is the idea that pretty much anyone
with a car, spare room, or knack for pastry-making can sign on as a
supplier. Consider the following:
Got a Car? Turn it into a money machine. The city is buzzing
and Uber makes it easy for you to cash in on the action. Plus,
you've already got everything you need to get started.68
Whether you're offering a seaside villa or an air mattress in the
69corner of your living room, it's free to list your space.
If you've got a vehicle, a smart phone, and a friendly,
professional work ethic - we've got an opportunity for you.
Even discounting for marketing hyperbole - after all, not anyone
with any car can be an Uber driver - there is real merit to the claim
that platforms reduce barriers to entry to previously unimaginable
levels.1 True, being a platform supplier sometimes requires a basic
criminal background check (also faced by many minimum wage
earners outside the sharing economy) and sometimes requires an
existing asset like a car (also a frequent, if implicit, requirement for
many minimum wage earners). But for the most part, suppliers face
no educational or specialized certification requirements, zero to low
capital expenditure, no incorporation paperwork, no set working
hours, and no designated place of employment. The ease with which
numerous people can participate in the sharing economy is one of its
great advantages. But it is also why "no regulation" advocates are
wrong to suggest that competition will drive platforms to offer
attractive terms to their suppliers.
Part of the problem is that platforms are eager to attract both
suppliers and consumers, but their strategies for appealing to one
68. Uber Needs Partners Like You, UBER, <https://get.uber.com/drive/> (last visited Mar.
22, 2016) (scroll down to "Make Good Money").
69. How to Host, AIRBNB, <https://www.airbnb.com/help/getting-started/how-to-host>
(last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (scroll down to "List your Space").
70. Deliv. In Your Community, DELIV, <http://www.deliv.co/drivers/> (last visited Mar. 22,
2016).
71. David Fagin, Life as an Uber Driver: It's Just Not Fare, HUFFINGTON POST (updated
Apr. 5, 2014), <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-fagin/life-as-an-uber-driver-b 4698299.
html> ("Becoming an Uber driver is actually a piece of cake. They'll pretty much take
anyone . .. as far as I can tell there's no license check; you simply get your vehicle's paperwork
and head to a nearby Holiday Inn... the cute 12-year-old girl running the show gives you your
Uber'd-out iPhone 5 ... and then says, 'Next?!' That's pretty much it. You're good to go.").
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often have complicated effects on their attractiveness to the other.
Take the surge pricing models used by Uber and Lyft: platforms
argue that raising prices (and driver profits) during high demand
periods ensures that the highest value users are able to get rides. But
surge pricing has an interesting side effect on drivers - as one Uber
driver rather bluntly put it, "Uber Passengers get a bill 2x-4x what
they approved when drunk the next morning, and rate the driver in
disgust with UBER, not the driver - even though they had an
amazing ride the night before and it goes on the Drivers [sic]
permanent record."72
Theoretically, this shouldn't happen since passengers are made
aware of the higher fares before they accept a ride - and, for sure, not
all surge period passengers are drunk. Just as certainly, though, it will
continue to happen. But most importantly, this decidedly unfair
outcome for suppliers is also a flaw in the model, which depends on
the assumption that feedback mechanisms generate information
that's useful for both consumers and platforms. When a passenger
"spite grades" a driver, that rating skews the system.
Finally, let's consider one more reason why platforms might have
interests that at least minimally align with their suppliers: the public
relations costs of appearing predatory. Note that this is about
attracting or retaining consumers on the basis of supplier treatment.
And indeed, several prominent non-platform companies have
increased wages to varying degrees in the past eighteen months, at
least partially because they want to appear like good corporate
citizens.73 There's no data on whether or not platform consumers care
enough to contribute to similar wage hikes - perhaps they do, but just
as plausibly, perhaps they'll be attracted to cheap, quick service
regardless of the conditions in which service providers work.74
2. "Self-Regulation is the Best Regulation"
"No regulation" advocates also argue that platforms are better
positioned to protect the non-economic goods driving regulation
72. Mimzy, supra note 42.
73. Jenny Che, 13 Companies That Aren't Waiting for Congress to Raise the Minimum
Wage, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 2, 2015, 9:46 AM ET), <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2015/04/02/companies-minimum-wage_n_6991672.html> (naming, among others, McDonald's,
Walmart, Aetna, Target, Starbucks, and Ikea).
74. See Hamari et al., supra, note 5, at 19-21 (concluding that attitudes toward the sharing
economy are positively affected by a belief that it promotes environmentally responsible
consumerism, but that "economic benefits (saving money and time)" have a more significant
effect on the likelihood of actual participation in the sharing economy).
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because they have expertise and methodological flexibility. In other
words, Feastly knows best what problems are likely to confront its
cooks and diners, and Feastly can find innovative ways of resolving
those problems. For the most part, these innovative methods consist
of two things: reputational feedback mechanisms and internal vetting
systems free of the red tape bogging down, say, health inspection
agencies.
Let's suppose that it really is in Feastly's interest to resolve all
the same problems that we have assigned to regulatory oversight,
which is no small assumption in itself. The question then becomes, are
Feastly's methods of self-regulation equal or superior to the
regulatory system it seeks to avoid? Put differently is it really true
that "bad actors get weeded out" as or more quickly "through better
information, reputational incentives, and aggressive community self-
policing?"7 ' There are strong (non-Feastly-specific) reasons to doubt
that this is the case.
Much of the punch for this argument comes from platforms' use
of reputational feedback mechanisms that let users rate each other
and make those scores public so that future users can use them in
their own decision-making. Reputational feedback is undoubtedly a
powerful and rapidly expanding tool, and is the focus of a growing
body of literature exploring how online communities foster
"cooperation and altruism in the face of anonymity."76 Nonetheless,
these feedback mechanisms have weaknesses that affect the accuracy
of the information available to platform users in non-negligible ways.
Moreover, there's no one-size-fits-all solution because the problems
vary from platform to platform depending on the mechanics of the
feedback system and on the way users interact with the platform.
For example, spite grading - mentioned earlier regarding Uber
and Lyft - is unlikely to be as problematic for Airbnb, Feastly, or
TaskRabbit, where the consumer's choice is made after some
research and probably without the constraints of an urgent meeting,
playoff game, or a night spent bar-hopping. Conversely, grade
75. Koopman et al., supra note 57, at 543.
76. Compare Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence
of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 508 (2003) (explaining that
cooperation in anonymous communities is facilitated by a "charismatic code," according to
which cooperative behavior is magnified and uncooperative behavior is masked), with Heng Li
Yang & Cheng Yu Lai, Motivations of Wikipedia Content Contributors, 26 COMPUTERS IN HUM.
BEHAV. 1377, 1382 (2010) (finding that knowledge-sharing behavior is primarily motivated by
its ability to reinforce conceptions of self that emphasize high achievement and knowledge,
rather than being motivated by a pleasure in helping others).
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inflation by both consumers and suppliers is probably less tied to the
circumstances of the transaction than on some combination of
dependence (on the platform) and emotional investment (in the
transaction) - which is an off-the-cuff hypothesis as to why
transportation and retail platforms like Uber, Ebay, and Amazon are
notorious for uselessly high ratings."
Most rating systems are also subject to packaging effects, where
the platform's use of algorithms, score averaging, and filters shapes
user choice. Virtually no platform simply provides information to
users and then steps back while they make decisions, although talk of
"resolving informational asymmetries" suggests that platforms do just
this. For example, most platforms where users read reviews before
making a choice "average and rank": they average out all reviews and
then rank according to average score. "Average and rank" helps sort
the huge quantities of information platforms control, but its
consequences for suppliers are powerful. Two restaurants on Yelp
with similar average scores (for example, 3.24 and 3.26 out of 5) will
be rounded to the nearest half point (3.0 and 3.5) for the purposes of
ranking. That half-point change has been "associated with being 21
percentage points more likely to have sold out all 7:00 PM tables and
moving from 3.5 to 4 stars makes restaurants an additional 19
percentage points more likely to have sold out all tables."7 Or, as Slee
puts it, "Yelp's own choices about how to present ratings,
independent of business 'quality' . . . [have] a significant effect on
some businesses."7 9
These accuracy problems are by no means unique to platforms:
reputational rankings occur in all kinds of consumer contexts, and,
right now, there's no reason to think that platforms are somehow
especially vulnerable to feedback failure.so But "no regulation"
77. Gary Bolton et al., Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation
Information, 59 MGMT. SCI. 265, 269 (2013) (noting that of 742,829 studied eBay users who had
received feedback at least once, 67 percent had a percentage positive 100 percent while 80.5
percent have a percentage positive greater than 99 percent).
78. Michael Anderson & Jeremy Magruder, Learning From the Crowd: Regression
Discontinuity Estimates of the Effects of an Online Review Database, 122 ECON. J. 957, 966
(2012).
79. Tom Slee, In Praise of Fake Reviews, WHIMSLEY (Oct. 5, 2014), <http://tomslee.net/
2014/10/in-praise-of-fake-reviews.html>. Other packaging effects include prioritizing users
according to their number of views and, more problematically, prioritizing them by their
willingness to purchase revenue-generating ads from the platform. Id.
80. Packaging effects and spite grading are also not the only problems in online rating
systems, but many other problems do not apply evenly across platforms. See Shrihari Sridhar &
Raji Srinivasan, Social Influence Effects in Online Product Rating, 76 J. MARKETING 70 (2012)
(arguing that online product ratings are influenced by previous ratings, and that previous ratings
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advocates stake a great deal on the idea that reputational feedback is
a better way of regulating the market than government intervention
because it as effectively realizes regulatory goals without inserting the
state into commercial transactions." So it's not enough that
reputational feedback "only" be vulnerable to the same weaknesses.
Moreover, "no regulation" advocates overstate the reliability of this
substitute and simplify the way it affects decision-making.
Of course, many platforms don't just leave users to rely on peer-
generated feedback. Instead, they establish internal vetting systems -
mostly to screen suppliers - as a way of adding to a consumer's sense
of security. For instance, Feastly states that "All Feastly Cooks go
through an extensive vetting process,"82 and assures diners that they
"personally vet every cook that joins Feastly and reinforce our
hosting guidelines to ensure the best experience from beginning to
end."83 Likewise, TaskRabbit announces on its homepage that "our
Taskers undergo an extensive vetting process,"' and later reiterates,
"[y]ou can trust our team of smart, talented Taskers, who have all
been thoroughly vetted."" Uber, as previously noted, used to tell
passengers that "within each city we operate, we aim to go above and
beyond local requirements to ensure your comfort and security."86 In
a sense, whereas platforms tell potential suppliers that "anyone can
be a part of our network," they tell potential consumers that "not just
anyone can be a part of our network."
There's nothing inherently wrong with this double message, but
its second half makes the efficacy of those vetting systems fair game
for some serious vetting of its own. This is particularly true if (as they
do) platforms claim that they protect non-economic goods like safety
and non-discrimination on par with regulatory oversight. We just do
exacerbate subsequent ratings respecting product failure); Xinxin Li & Lorin M. Hitt, Self-
Selection and Information Role of Online Product Reviews, 19 INFO. SYs. RES. 456 (2008)
(arguing that online ratings suffer from self-selection bias that in turn affects consumer purchase
behavior especially when earlier consumers have idiosyncratic preferences).
81. For instance, Koopman et al. state that "the Internet largely solves this problem [of
market failure] by providing consumers with robust search and monitoring tools to find more
and better choices." Koopman et al., supra note 57, at 540-41 (emphasis added).
82. A Close-Knit Community, FEASTLY, <https://eatfeastly.com/info/trust-and-safety/>
(last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (scroll down to "Verified").
83. FAQ Feasters, FEASTLY, <https://eatfeastly.com/info/faq/feasters/> (last visited Mar.
22, 2016) (scroll down and click "How do you ensure good, clean food in a safe environment").
84. We Do Chores. You Live Life, TASKRABBIT, <https://www.taskrabbit.com> (last
visited Mar. 22, 2016) (scroll down to "Trust and Safety").
85. How TaskRabbit Works, TASKRABBIT <https://www.taskrabbit.com/how-it-works>
(last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
86. See supra note 36.
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not have the data to determine whether personally vetting cooks via
photos, questionnaires, and sample menus actually protects diner
welfare as effectively as licensing and compliance checks." Perhaps
this is all it takes to ensure a safe and sanitary dining experience - in
which case, at the very least, we may need to rethink some of our
existing food and health regulations. But we don't know.
Moreover, even if Feastly's personal vetting system does the trick
as well as existing health inspection schemes, Feastly cannot - and
importantly, does not - guarantee that its vetting standards will
always remain sufficiently protective of regulatory goods. In other
words, platforms protect regulatory goods at their pleasure. (To make
an extreme comparison, consider the disintegration of the Kimberley
Process for preventing the sale of "blood diamonds.")" The claim that
platforms are more likely to protect those goods than incumbent
industries depends on the idea that something in the platform model
renders platform motivations vis-f-vis regulatory goods essentially
irrelevant: they have to do things in a way that protects those goods.
But it is not at all clear that what differentiates platforms from a
quality control perspective - reputational feedback and internal




A majority of commentators - including myself - advocate a
87. And it's not clear that transportation platforms screen drivers as effectively as they
claim to. Eight members of Congress recently issued a letter to the CEOs of Uber, Lyft, and
SideCar acknowledging that these platforms "conduct private background checks when vetting
potential drivers" but observing that "[following] multiple instances of sexual assault by drivers
hired to work in your industry" the platforms should "take additional steps ... [specifically]
fingerprint-based background checks." Letter from Rosa L. DeLauro et al., U.S. House of
Representatives, to Travis Kalanick, Executive Officer, Uber Techs. et al. (Mar. 9, 2015) (on file
with author). But transportation platforms aren't the only ones coming under fire. See, e.g., Julie
Bort, Banned Airbnb Host Who Entered the House While His Guests Were Sleeping Was Back
on Airbnb, Bus. INSIDER (Oct. 6, 2014), <http://www.businessinsider.com/banned-airbnb-host-
was-back-on-the-site-2014-10>.
88. Virginia Haufler, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation in
Global Governance and Conflict Prevention, 89 J. Bus. ETHICS 403 (2009); Press Release,
Charmian Gooch, Founding Director, Global Witness, Why We Are Leaving the Kimberley
Process (Dec. 3, 2011) (on file with author) (announcing Global Witness' withdrawal from
participation in the Kimberley Process because the Process "failed to deal with the trade in
conflict diamonds... turned an international conflict prevention mechanism into a cynical
corporate accreditation scheme... [and] proved beyond doubt that voluntary schemes are not
going to cut it").
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broad in-between position I call "wait-and-see." Everyone in this
camp agrees that some platform regulation is both desirable and
inevitable, but we differ over the timing and content of regulatory
intervention. On the one hand are those who think that we lack
enough information about proper timing and content to productively
intervene. Sundararajan, for instance, has moved from his original
2012 Wired position that "government intervention will continually
become less critical"89 to saying that "we should wait and see what the
market actually provides and then sort of reframe our regulations so
that the government's intervention is surgical."90 But surgical
intervention depends on the following difficult-to-support
assumptions: (1) there will be a point when we have sufficient
information to enact strategic regulations, (2) we'll recognize that
point when we reach it, (3) it won't be too late by then, and (4) it is
too early now.
Assumptions one and two are highly question-begging. How will
we know that we have sufficient information without first
determining the kinds of information we want? How can we decide
what kinds of information we want without first developing a working
statutory model? And even if we can resolve these issues, how would
we gather information when platforms are not required - and are
frequently unwilling - to share it?91 Surgical intervention, for all its
overtones of targeted action, does not have good answers for these
questions.
Assumption three has an implied referent: "it won't be too late
[to ensure that regulatory goods are protected]." But regulatory
goods are not all that's risked by waiting: not enacting moderate
regulation can make it easier to shunt out platforms, as New York
City and Portland have done, to differing success.92
89. Arun Sundararajan, Why the Government Doesn't Need to Regulate the Sharing
Economy, WIRED (Oct. 22, 2012, 1:45 PM), <http://www.wired.com/2012/10/from-airbnb-to-
coursera-why-the-government-shouldnt-regulate-the-sharing-economy/>.
90. Arun Sundararajan, Professor of Info., Operations & Mgmt. Sci., N.Y.U. Stern Sch. of
Bus., Panel discussion for the Congressional Internet Congress Advisory Committee: Should
Congress Be Caring about Sharing? Regulation and the Future of Uber, Airbnb and the Sharing
Economy (Dec. 8, 2014), available at <http://m.stern.nyu.edu/faculty-research/professor-arun-
sundararajan-speaks-about-regulation-of-the-sharing-economy-on-a-congressional-panel>.
91. See Stein, supra note 45 (on Uber's resistance to sharing information about requests
for accessible vehicles); Zeynep Tufekci & Brayden King, We Can't Trust Uber, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/08/opinion/we-cant-trust-uber.html?_r=0> (ad-
vocating "information fiduciaries," or "independent, external bodies that oversee how data is
used, backed by laws that ensure that individuals can see, correct and opt out of data
collection").
92. New York has been famously fighting Airbnb for some time. RES. DEP'T & INTERNET
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The music file-sharing website Napster is a great example of
waiting gone wrong. Napster also used new technology to enable
more flexible and tailored consumption, and it also skirted existing
laws virtually unopposed until, within two short years, it was
effectively gone.93 Of course, platforms are unlikely to face extinction
at the hands of their incumbent opponents - Napster's opponents had
far deeper pockets and broader reach than the opponents of
platforms, and Napster's opponents also had national laws rather than
local regulations to back them up.94 But rapid and unregulated
expansion has led some cities to turn away from platforms at the first
sign of trouble, so surgical intervention must also show why waiting
will not be too late for platforms themselves.
Finally, the intuition behind waiting to regulate is that early
regulation discourages innovation. For argument's sake, let's grant
that there is such a thing as premature regulation: even so, there are
still three reasons why we needn't play the guessing game of surgical
intervention. First, it is not so very early to regulate platforms: Airbnb
and TaskRabbit launched in 2008, while Uber and Getaround started
in 2009. Enough time has passed that four important things have
occurred:95 (1) we can identify the core elements of a platform
business model (participation and substitution to facilitate third party
transactions);96 (2) suppliers have identified some of the problems in
platform models (insurance requirements, account termination,
missing feedback opportunity, price fluctuations - there's even a
thriving message board devoted to disgruntled Uber drivers);' (3)
some platforms have engaged in limited responses to those problems
(the $1 million secondary insurance policies offered by Uber, Airbnb,
and Feastly, among others, as well as Uber's latest settlement creating
BUREAU, ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. ATTORNEY GEN., AIRBNB IN THE CITY (2014) (on file
with author). And a very few cities have banned or restricted transportation platforms. See, e.g.,
ANDREW MOYLAN ET AL., R STREET POLICY STUDY No. 29, RIDESCORE 2014: HIRED DRIVER
RULES IN U.S. CITIES (2014) (on file with author) (giving New York a "D" and Portland an "F"
for hospitability to transportation platforms like Uber and Lyft).
93. See generally Tom Lamont, Napster: The Day the Music Was Set Free, THE
GUARDIAN, Feb. 23, 2013, 19:05 EST), <http://www.theguardian.com/music/2013/feb/24/nap
ster-music-free-file-sharing>.
94. See id.
95. For instance, see New York's estimate that, as of October 2014, 72 percent of the
reservations made in New York City between 2010-14 (or 300,891 reservations in total) were in
violation of building use and zoning laws. RES. DEP'T & INTERNET BUREAU, ERIC T.
SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 92, at 8.
96. See Section II(B).
97. Uber Drivers Forum, UBERPEOPLE, <http://uberpeople.net> (last visited Mar. 22,
2016).
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a "drivers association" and ending automatic account termination);
and (4) platforms' growing lobbying power makes their battle with
incumbents more like Hector and Ajax than like David and Goliath.98
Second, the very rise of platforms suggests that moderate
regulation will not impede innovation - platforms, after all, have
ingeniously navigated legal grey (and sometimes red) zones in the
pursuit of a new business model. That's no reason to punish them via
harsh regulation - and we shouldn't - but it's also no support for the
idea that regulation pre-emptively quashes innovation. Moreover,
platforms themselves don't axiomatically oppose regulation: at a
conference on the sharing economy, for instance, Lyft's Director of
Government Relations stated that the company actually prefers to
absorb insurance acquisition costs because its research shows that
potential drivers are turned off by the expense and time involved in
getting or changing personal insurance.99
Finally, we should keep in mind that cities themselves are
reaching for regulatory responses. This isn't itself an argument for
regulation - let's not infer an "ought" from an "is" - but it is an
argument for thinking through potential regulatory responses on the
double. Washington, D.C., Chicago, San Francisco, Seattle, Boston,
Minneapolis - all of these cities have concluded that it is possible to
regulate platforms without dooming them to extinction and that they
need to impose some regulations now.o00
In the end, the biggest difference between surgical intervention
and other "wait-and-see" approaches is not about when to intervene -
that's a decision that cities must make, and are making, based on their
individual needs. Rather, the difference is about whether we can
intelligently respond to the regulatory issues presented by platforms
given what we already know, or whether we need to wait for an
undetermined amount of time. I strongly suggest that we can and
should start developing regulatory models for cities to use when they
98. See Jon Liss, Uber the Job Destroyer, THE NATION, Feb. 16, 2015, at 16, 20 (noting that
besides "hiring President Obama's lead strategist David Plouffe as a 'campaign manager,' Uber
and Lyft have hired four of Richmond's five largest lobbying firms for the 2015 legislative
battle" and that in Virginia "[Uber] has the ear of Governor McAuliffe and Attorney General
Mark Herring" granting it a "mix of traditional pocket-lining lobbying, slick PR campaigns and
the bully power of billionaire backers").
99. Joseph Okpaku, Director of Government Relations, Lyft, Inc., Presentation at the
Fordham Urban Law Center Conference: Sharing Economy, Sharing City: Urban Law and the
New Economy (Apr. 24, 2015).
100. See Vanessa Katz, Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1067,
1084-92 (2015); Jon Brooks, City by City, Lyft and Uber Take on Taxis, Regulators, KOED
(Mar. 3, 2014), <http://ww2.kqed.org/news/2014/03/03/lyft-uber-regulation/>.
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find them necessary - in other words, that we should "try and see"
rather than continue waiting.
2. "Try-and-See"
The last group of commentators think that we do have enough
information to begin formulating regulatory responses even if we
can't identify a time to intervene that is optimal across all contexts.
Essentially these commentators ask, "in a world where local
governments have already started to regulate platforms, what sort of
regulations should they enact?"o
Suggestions so far have been industry-specific and mostly
concerned with third party problems like "noisy neighbors" in the
context of short-term rentals,10 how platforms affect industry
incumbents,103 and the tax implications of sharing rather than owning
resources.1 04 A few scholars have explicitly considered supplier
concerns: Benjamin Edelman and Michael Luca, whose work on
discrimination against black Airbnb hosts was cited in Section 11(b),os
and Eric Goldman, who has written about online account
termination.10 6 Goldman's work is particularly interesting even though
it is not specifically geared towards the sharing economy because
unilateral account termination is an important supplier concern, and
because section 230(c)(2) of the Communications Decency Act
arguably immunizes platforms as "provider[s] . . . of an interactive
computer service."1 07
But industry-specific regulation has its own shortcomings.
Focusing on a particular industry like short-term rentals or
ridesharing overlooks similarities in supplier concerns. Likewise,
adapting existing legal tools to platforms underemphasizes the extent
101. Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government Law: The
Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901 (2015); Roberta A.
Kaplan & Michael L. Nadler, Airbnb: A Case Study in Occupancy Regulation and Taxation, 82
U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 103 (2015).
102. Miller, supra note 6; Horton, supra note 52.
103. Georgios Zervas et al., The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of
Airbnb on the Hotel Industry (Boston Univ. Sch. of Mgmt. Res. Paper No. 2013-16, Jan. 27,
2016) (on file with author).
104. Barry & Caron, supra note 58.
105. Edelman & Luca, supra note 40.
106. Eric Goldman, Online User Account Termination and 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), 2 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 659, 671 (2012) (arguing that § 230 immunity helps guarantee "fast, cheap, and
reliable" wins to online providers who police their premises and advocating that the immunity
be strengthened by removing the statute's "good faith" reference").
107. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
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to which platforms genuinely alter the nature of employment. We can
circumvent both these problems by recognizing that suppliers face
certain core challenges regardless of the industry in which they
operate. That is to say, platforms really do challenge our fundamental
assumptions about employment types and any proposed regulations
will have to tackle the ways in which platform employment differs
from various kinds of traditional employment. The rest of this section
will articulate two important disjunctures between platforms and the
current employment models under which they operate.
First, suppliers assume personal liability for mishaps in a way
that their industry counterparts do not. The fact that some platforms
provide suppliers with secondary insurance policies is no response,
since not all platforms offer secondary insurance and they have no
obligation to do so. Similarly, the argument that workers pay for
amenities and are paid for disamenities doesn't explain what amenity
suppliers are paying for, in comparison to "Independent
Contractors," when they assume all of the same risks without even
the benefit of a contract with their platforms. Many of the
Independent Contractors in these comparisons - say, taxi drivers -
have comparable freedom over their schedules, incur similar capital
expenses, and (compared to some suppliers) have greater control
over their profit margins as well as less stringent performance
oversight. Others, like FedEx drivers, may have less freedom over
their schedules and comparable capital expenses, but have greater
financial and contractual security.'os
A second disjuncture between platform employment and current
employment models is that suppliers must meet vetting and
reputational feedback standards - which isn't just a matter of
providing excellent customer service, as we saw in Section III(A)(ii) -
and they must do so without any legal protections, financial security,
or bargaining power.109 The rationale is that platforms are more like
facilitators of third party contracts than like "employers" of any kind,
108. See Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 985-86 (9th Cir. 2014)
(observing that drivers are compensated "according to a somewhat complex formula that
includes per day and per-stop components," that drivers contract with FedEx "for an initial
term of one, two, or three years" followed by an automatic renewal option and that the
relationship may be terminated "(1) by the parties' mutual agreement; (2) for cause, including a
breach of any provision of the OA; (3) if FedEx stops doing business or educes operations in all
or part of the driver's service area; or (4) upon thirty days' written notice by the driver").
109. Again, although drivers associations are a good step forward, they do not resolve this
issue since they lie outside the scope of the National Labor Relations Act and are not
empowered to bargain collectively on behalf of platform suppliers.
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so those protections are inapplicable to them.
But as we've already seen, that analogy is strained. Feastly
decides whom to recognize as a cook, what expectations they must
meet, when those expectations are met, whether to de-activate them
from the network, and whether they will be eligible to engage in
further transactions.`0 It's true that Feastly doesn't pair individual
diners and cooks or decide whether a given pair engages in repeat
transactions - but it does make a threshold choice in both cases by
determining who can participate in its network. This is a small but
highly significant detail that belies arguments against the existence of
any employment relationship between platforms and suppliers."'
The take away is that employment in the sharing economy is just
plain different. Platforms and suppliers are in an employment
relationship, but where this relationship stands on the spectrum of
legal categories ranging from "nothing" to "Employer-Employee" is
open to interpretation. There are good reasons to think that suppliers
are comparable to Independent Contractors and good reasons to
think that suppliers are more like Employees. However, a few
features of the platform-supplier relationship suggest that we may
need to construct platform-specific regulations. In the final section of
the article, I suggest some of the concerns that any such regulation
must account for as well as concerns that regulatory responses can't
or don't need to address given the broader landscape of employment
law in the United States.
IV. REGULATING SHARING ECONOMY EMPLOYMENT
Given the analysis in Part II and Part III, we can imagine several
distinct supplier concerns. Suppliers might be worried about safety,
discrimination, and financial guarantees, among other things.
However, not all of these can or should be part of a regulatory
response to sharing economy employment.
110. De-activation is an especially sore point for suppliers. Platforms - especially
transportation platforms - often contrast their de-activation standards with the specter of the
rude and incompetent cab driver with the grimy car. But "the trade-off for the relatively low pay
[from driving a cab] was job security" - with lower pay as well as the specter of de-activation
persistently looming above them, platform drivers pay a high price for the flexibility offered by
platforms. Liss, supra note 98, at 18.
111. An objection might go, "Feastly doesn't prevent you from being a for-hire cook - it
just prevents you from being a for-hire cook on its platform! That's exactly like a potential client
choosing to not hire an independent contractor." Maybe. But then we should ask why, when
Feastly does let you be a for-hire cook on its platform, it's not like a client choosing to hire an
independent contractor.
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A. Safety & Insurance
The reason platforms engage in internal vetting is to assure
consumers of their personal safety when sitting in a car, renting an
apartment, or letting a stranger into their house to clean their garage.
Ensuring supplier safety might seem to be nothing more than the
commonsensical inverse of this practice - after all, who would choose
to welcome a stranger into their car without any assurances as to the
stranger's tendency to violence or property destruction? And yet,
platforms mostly don't vet consumers.
Although it may seem counterintuitive, personal safety is one
area in which the "no-regulation" folks are probably right to say that
we don't need new legal protections. This is less because platforms'
interests regarding safety naturally align with supplier interests
(although they likely do) and more because suppliers usually have the
means to seek recourse under existing laws. Remember that the
sharing economy operates by linking previously unknown strangers,
not by preserving anonymity: if I rent my apartment to someone on
Airbnb and she assaults me as I'm walking out the door, I can file a
claim under state law because I have access to her name (and perhaps
more). Much the same can be said for property destruction, even
though many major insurance providers refuse to recognize claims
stemming from the insurance holder's commercial use of their
property.1 12 There are already insurance providers who specifically
target platform suppliers and more are likely to tap into this growing
market.1 13 In other words, suppliers already have the means to address
many if not all of the personal and property safety issues they
encounter. Granting them more benefits - like workers'
compensation or workplace health and safety protections - ignores
the realities of platform employment and attempts to squeeze
suppliers into the existing regulatory category of Employee.
The real reason why we should consider imposing some sort of
mandatory insurance obligation on platforms is that platform activity
creates risks for society at large, and the costs associated with those
risks should not fall solely on suppliers. These risks are similar to the
"noisy neighbors" problem that Miller and Horton have examined in
112. Carolyn Said, Leaked Transcript Shows Geico's Stance Against Uber, Lyft, SFGATE
(Nov. 23, 2014), <http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Leaked-transcript-shows-Geico-s-stan
ce-against-5910113.php#next>.
113. See, e.g., the insurance products available at Peers. Portable Benefits, PEERS,
<www.peers.org> (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
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the short-term rental context, but they apply to more than short-term
rentals and involve more than annoyance. Besides, "industry
incumbents" like taxi medallion owners and hoteliers have to
maintain commercial insurance on their properties for exactly this
reason: they produce activity that creates social risks as well as social
benefits. Why should platforms be any different?
Many of the most prominent platforms have already started
providing secondary insurance in response to negative media
coverage.114 But without an insurance requirement, smaller platforms
(who are less likely to invite widespread media censure) may not
offer secondary insurance, and bigger platforms remain free to roll
back or eliminate insurance coverage when it's no longer necessary
from a public relations perspective."'
That's not to say that providing insurance won't affect platform
pricing, but probably not in the way "no regulation" folks might
think: platforms will incur the cost of policies and payouts, and they'll
most likely pass those costs on to suppliers via lower profit margins
rather than to consumers via higher rates. This might still be
preferable for suppliers whose personal insurance policies are
inadequate (higher premiums or deductibles) or preclude claims
incurred during unauthorized business activities.
B. Guaranteed Earnings & Employment Benefits16
One of the most common supplier complaints is that platform
employment just doesn't pay. (By contrast, the lack of benefits is not
a common complaint.) This isn't to say that suppliers end up in the
red because of their work for platforms, but they often earn
significantly less than what was advertised to them and, sometimes, at
114. Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, Feastly, and TaskRabbit all currently offer $1 million in secondary
insurance. What Cooks Should Know, FEASTLY, <https://eatfeastly.com/info/cook-protection/>
(last visited Mar. 22, 2016); Host Protection Insurance, AIRBNB, <https://www.airbnb.com/host-
protection-insurance> (last visited Mar. 22, 2016); Nairi, Insurance for UberX with Ridesharing,
UBER NEWSROOM, <https://newsroom.uber.com/insurance-for-uberx-with-ridesharing/> (last
visited Mar. 22, 2016); The TaskRabbit Guarantee Terms, TASKRABBIT, <https://www.
taskrabbit.com/guarantee> (last visited Mar. 22, 2016); We Go the Extra Mile for Safety, LYFT,
<https://www.lyft.com/safety> (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
115. But cf Rogers, supra note 44, at 93 (asking whether there is "any reason to think that
problems of dangerous or underinsured Uber drivers will not be self-correcting" since "[a]ny
rash of accidents will lead quickly to public ire and calls for regulation or will create an opening
for Uber's competitors").
116. The distinction between guaranteed earnings and Employment benefits is clearly
somewhat artificial, but since they're usually discussed separately in conversations where
economists aren't present, I'll do the same here.
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or below the minimum wage of their locality.1 17
It could be that the opportunities afforded by any given platform
don't generate sufficient income, as with Jennifer Guidry who found
herself working three jobs via four platforms and a swapper
(Craigslist)."t It could also be that net earnings per transaction are
low, or - particularly in the case of transportation platforms - it could
be that they're unstable because platforms engage in constant and
unilateral price adjusting. There's certainly enough narrative and
numerical data to make a compelling case that the arbitrariness of
platform earnings is simply "unfair."
Regardless, there are three reasons why it's a bad idea to include
Employment benefits and guaranteed earnings (whether in the sense
of fixed earnings per time period or fixed net earnings per
transaction) in any regulatory response. First, doing so
misunderstands the nature of platform employment in a way that's
equal and opposite to the claim that suppliers and platforms have no
employment relationship whatsoever. Granting Uber drivers or
Airbnb hosts Employment benefits would place them at an advantage
relative to most half-time and many effectively full-time Employees -
and on what basis?
Second, guaranteed earnings and Employment benefits are just
too hard to implement. For one thing, platforms vary widely in how
they set prices: compare Uber and Lyft's platform-dictated real-time
pricing119 with Deliv's platform-dictated predetermined pricing20 with
Airbnb and TaskRabbit's supplier-dictated pricing.121 Coming up with
117. UberDriverMiami, Dear Travis: A Miami Uber Driver Takes Exception to the
Company's Rate Cuts, PANDO (Jan. 26, 2015), <http://pando.com/2015/01/26/dear-travis-a-
miami-uber-driver-takes-exception-to-the-companys-rate-cuts/> (calculating, for example, that
Uber's advertised $20/hr fares amounts to $4.32/hr after subtracting operational expenses and
Uber fees). Compare Fagin, supra note 71 (in which the author calculated hourly net earnings of
$8) with History of the Hourly Minimum Wage, N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF LABOR,
<https://www.labor.ny.gov/stats/minimum wage.asp> (last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (indicating that
the minimum wage in New York was $7.25 until Dec. 31, 2013, at which point it became $8).
118. Singer, supra note 64.
119. See Kalev Leetaru, The $ 200 Uber Ride and the Realtime Data-Driven Sharing
Economy, FORBES (Jan. 2, 2016, 9:28 AM), <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru
/2016/01/02/the-200-uber-ride-and-the-realtime-data-driven-sharing-economy/#5e6e31c43056>;
Prime Time for Drivers, LYFT, <https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/214586017-Prime-Time-
for-Drivers> (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
120. See Same Day Local Courier Service, DELIV, <https://www.deliv.co/business/> (last
visited Mar. 22, 2016) (scroll down to "The details") ("We messenger multiple packages to the
same destination for one price.").
121. See, e.g., Hourly Rates and Negotiations, TASKRABBIT, <https://www.taskrabbit.com
/guidelines#hourlyjrates> ("In your profile you have the ability to set your hourly rate for
different task types.").
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a sensible method to fix supplier earnings, let alone to identify a
target amount or percentage, would be extremely difficult. And even
if we could figure out the mechanics of implementing guaranteed
earnings across platforms, the resulting system would most likely
produce a degree of instability that isn't obviously preferable for
suppliers. This is because any such system would likely be linked to a
supplier's level of participation (hours or transactions per day, week,
month) but that would create a world in which a supplier might have
a fixed profit margin and/or benefits one week but not the next.
Third, some - though not all - financial concerns are a fair way to
being fixed by the market itself. SherpaShare is a new service that
allows suppliers on rideshare platforms to calculate their net earnings
per ride, determine which areas allow them to earn the highest profit,
and compare their earnings with other suppliers on the same
platforms.122 (Of course, the "earnings per area" function of
SherpaShare may dilute one of the consumer benefits that rideshare
platforms most love to tout - that they make it easier for customers to
get rides in typically underserved areas - but that's beyond the scope
of this article.) Similarly, an app called Even allows suppliers to
provide themselves with a regular income: the app uses a separate
Even-managed savings account to bank weekly earnings above a
certain threshold. When the user's weekly earnings fall below the
threshold, the app pays them back the missing income out of the
banked surplus.12 3
It would take a small herd of social scientists to establish this, but
there's reason to believe that suppliers don't consider themselves
traditional Employees and don't expect the traditional perks of that
status. What the conversation so far suggests is that suppliers want a
recognition of their relationship with platforms that opens up the
possibility of two-way engagement. Right now, in the words of a
TaskRabbit Tasker, "Without us, [they're] just an empty app on a
phone. I don't understand why they don't listen to us."124
122. Natasha Singer & Mike Isaac, An App That Helps Drivers Earn the Most From Their
Trips, N.Y. Times, May 9, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/10/technology/a-dashboard-
management-consultant.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=second-column-
region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0>; see also The #1 Support Platform for On-
Demand Workers, SherpaShare, <https://www.sherpashare.com> (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
123. Anand Giridharadas, What a Steady Income? There's an App For That, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 29, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/magazine/want-a-steady-income-theres-an-
app-for-that.html>; see also Financial Stability in an App, EVEN, <https://even.me> (last visited
Mar. 22, 2016).
124. Harrison Weber, TaskRabbit Users Revolt as the Company Shuts Down Its Bidding
System, VENTUREBEAT (July 10, 2014), <http://venturebeat.com/2014/07/10/taskrabbit-users-
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C. Discrimination & Contractual Security
Two other issues deserve mention, although neither demands
regulatory response. As things stand, suppliers are not protected
against discrimination based on federally protected categories. It's no
use to say that platforms lack motivation to discriminate against
suppliers. Non-discrimination protections (like those afforded by
Title VII and the ADA) do not only apply to Employers who might
have rational justification for discriminating - and anyway, as we saw
earlier, platform interests and supplier interests aren't as aligned as
they might first appear. Indeed, commentators have already noted a
racial bias in platform advertising.125
But granting suppliers federal anti-discrimination protections
effectively places them on par with Employees, since Independent
Contractors are not covered by most federal non-discrimination laws.
And the truth is that we don't know whether or not suppliers are
subject to unlawful discrimination by platforms. This certainly means
that platforms need to share more information, but it does not mean
that they should automatically be subject to the entire federal anti-
discrimination apparatus.
Similarly, suppliers frequently bemoan the lack of security and
transparency in their relationships with platforms.126 Perhaps this will
be taken care of via litigation - as in the recent Uber settlement - and
if it is, so much the better. But to say that platforms must justify de-
activations, either to the supplier in question or to a third party, is to
say that platform employment is only subject to for-cause
termination. It would give suppliers a greater degree of protection
than many Employees, and consequently it presupposes a world in
which at-will employment is the exception rather than the norm.127
That just isn't the world, or at least the country, we live in.
revolt-as-the-company-shuts-down-its-bidding-system/>.
125. Brishen Rogers, Assoc. Professor of Law, Beasley Sch. of Law, Temple Univ.,
Presentation at the Fordham Urban Law Center Conference: Sharing Economy, Sharing City:
Urban Law and the New Economy (Apr. 24, 2015).
126. Kel, Uber Driver (San Francisco), Comment to 0: "How Long Have You Worked for
Uber?" A: "I Don't Work for Uber", UberPeople (Jan. 13, 2015), <http://uberpeople.
net/threads/q-how-long-have-you-worked-for-uber-a-i-dont-work-for-uber.11248/#post-141255>
(on file with author) (noting that "being a driver, you can't help but feel this "uneasy" every day
you go to drive because "when is the next price cut" "what policies will uber change this time"
"will there be too many drivers and I can't get a customer?"... [T]his constant feeling...
changes you as a driver and you eventually get sick of it").
127. Joseph E. Slater, The "American Rule" that Swallows the Exceptions, 11 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL'Y J. 53, 54 (criticizing the at-will doctrine but acknowledging that the doctrine "seems
natural and perhaps necessary in American culture").
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V. CONCLUSION
Even if we acknowledge the existence of an "employment"
relationship between suppliers and platforms, that relationship most
likely doesn't reach the level of the Employee-Employer tie under
current laws. This leaves us with two problems. First, how do we
respond to the employment concerns triggered by this new and
exciting type of economic activity? As we've seen, some response is
probably necessary - both to acknowledge the existence of a
contractual employment relationship, and to ensure that risks created
by that relationship don't unfairly fall on suppliers. But given existing
laws, Employment classification systems, as well as the development
of a few market-based tools, many of the protections that suppliers
may want seem either infeasible or unnecessary.
The second problem is much harder, since it entails sincere
engagement with the basic assumptions of our economy and society.
What would an economy increasingly populated by "Jennifers,"
working multiple platform jobs with (as things stand now) no
employment contracts, no protections, no fixed earnings and no
benefits, look like? To what extent do we think technology has
equalized asymmetries of power between workers and companies
such that unionization is a superfluous privilege reserved for an
increasingly select few? How much work are we willing to let people
do before we call them workers?
These are difficult and longstanding questions in labor and
employment law for which there are no easy answers.128 But the idea
that service providers in the sharing economy lack any employment
relationship at all with their companies is just one more example of
the "conceptual stretching" of work classifications in contemporary
America. As more and more Americans become "Jennifers," we will
need to reconsider whether we are happy letting them work for
multiple companies without ever having the recognition, or the safety,
of having a "job."
128. On the problem of categorizing employment relationships, see generally Noah D. Zatz,
Beyond Misclassification: Tackling the Independent Contractor Problem Without Redefining
Employment, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 280 (2011) (arguing that "refinements to the
employee/independent contractor distinction fail to confront employers' power to shape their
business practices to substitute contracting for employment and thereby reduce the threat of
unionization").
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